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I.   Introduction
Partnerships often begin in a state of uncertainty, where there is some doubt about the
prospect of success.  In such an environment, the partners may "start small" by first attempting
small-scale projects and then, if they are successful, graduating to larger ones.  In this way, the
parties structure their relationship in order to learn about one another before committing a great
deal of resources to the enterprise.  When deciding how to interact, partners also consider the
chance that they will eventually terminate their relationship.  The value of termination depends on
how easily other matches can be made and on the information available about prospective new
partners.
We design a simple model to explore the interaction between how ongoing relationships
are structured and the process by which they are formed.  The basic, decision-theoretic analysis
combines the problem of investment under uncertainty with the problem of optimal search.  An
extension of the model incorporates the strategic issue of contract enforcement.  We study the
relationship between parameters of the matching environment (such as the cost of search) and the
extent to which partners start small.  We also examine complementarities between various
endogenous features of partnerships, including the extent of starting small, longevity of
partnerships, and methods of contract enforcement.  The main goal of our theoretical exercise is
to capture, with the simplest possible model, a variety of realistic features of the formation and
structure of long-term relationships.  We hope this will encourage empirical research on the
dynamic structure of partnerships.
Development of our model was motivated by our desire to understand a characteristic way2
in which developed country (DC) firms make their decisions regarding cooperation with a
potential less developed country (LDC) partner.  Egan and Mody (1992) surveyed United States
buyers operating in LDCs, including “manufacturers, retailers, importers, buyers’ agents, and joint
venture partners” (p. 322), and found that “buyers often begin with small orders, perhaps for a
simple product, and let the relationship [with the LDC firm] build gradually” (p. 330).  The
purpose of the small order is to learn about the capabilities of the LDC firm’s manager and
workers to meet the DC firm’s requirements for price, quality, and delivery.  Egan and Mody
state (p. 326):
Buyers looking for either new sources of supply or joint venture
partners search for suppliers who manage their factories efficiently,
often regardless of the level of technology those factories currently
employ; interviewees commonly felt that new machines could easily
be installed so long as workers already had the ability to use them
efficiently and absorb training readily.  For many buyers,
management was the most important factor in defining an ideal
supplier....As one buyer phrased it, “I do not invest in plant X but in
Mr. Y.  It all depends on the people.”
We model the DC firm’s search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship
between the two parties.  Matched firms can “start small” in our model.
Clearly one is more likely to learn Mr. Y’s true type, as it were, the more the initial order
resembles the product(s) that the DC firm ultimately wants to buy in large quantity.  Hence the
DC firm learns more, the more assistance it provides such as visits to the supplier’s plant by
engineers or other technical staff.  In our analysis we therefore not only allow the DC firm to
choose whether or not to start small but also to choose the intensity with which it starts small.  
If the small order is filled to the DC firm’s satisfaction, it moves on to a large project in
partnership with the LDC firm.  In practice this ranges anywhere from a large order and finance3
     
1We assume that only one large project is available and therefore do not attempt to explain the
choice between different types of large project.  To some extent this choice is determined by the
DC firm’s characteristics, e.g., whether it is a retailer or a manufacturer.
for working capital to fulfill it up to a joint venture in building a more modern plant with larger
capacity.
1  Clearly starting small involves not only direct cost but also delay relative to doing the
large project immediately.  It can only be understood as a way of avoiding the loss of a large
investment in the event that the LDC firm turns out to be incapable of producing at levels of price,
quality, and delivery that yield profit to the DC firm.  For this reason we will regard the DC firm’s
investment as irreversible (a sunk cost) in our analysis.
We show that the intensity with which the DC firm starts small is increasing in the
probability that the large project will be successful, increasing in the profitability of the large
project, and decreasing in the investment the large project requires.  We also show that the more
risky is the large project, the more likely is the DC firm to start small.  
The risk of a failed partnership is not the only reason a DC firm might want to start small.
The high cost of finding another partner might be a factor as well:  otherwise, if the odds for
success do not look good enough, why not just find another partner?  Hence we speak of an
“unfamiliar” rather than an “uncertain” environment:  it is not just the riskiness of investment in
LDC partners but also the high cost of search in LDCs that may favor starting small.  The cost of
search is therefore a key parameter in our analysis, and we confirm that starting small is more
likely when search costs are high.  
Since in our model uncertainty of the DC firm regarding its investment is resolved in an
ongoing relationship with its partner, a new supplier (e.g., from another LDC) is placed at a
disadvantage relative to the existing supplier even if the initial investment of the DC firm has been4
     
2Egan and Mody cite Vernon-Wortzel, Wortzel, and Deng (1988) in explaining that “some
suppliers, especially those trying to penetrate a new market, promise quantities, delivery dates, or
prices which they cannot achieve, and then are surprised at the buyer’s angry reaction.”
fully depreciated and must be renewed.  In other words, the fact that the DC firm does not know
the “type” of the new supplier but has learned that its current supplier is the “good” type
(otherwise it would have found another one) makes it more difficult for the former to break into
the DC market.  On the basis of their aforementioned survey, Egan and Mody (1992, p. 329)
report that “U.S. buyers prefer to stay with suppliers they know....Buyers commonly report taking
on new suppliers only when they foresee increased sales beyond current suppliers’ capacity or
when existing suppliers cannot meet changing quality or price requirements....the number of
‘windows of opportunity’ for new supplier firms may be limited.”   We derive results on the
persistence of relationships between DC firms and their partners.  Given certain restrictions we
are able to show that, conditional on a successful large project, the expected longevity of a
partnership that started small is at least as great as the expected longevity of a partnership that
started big.
In addition to the problem of finding a high-quality LDC firm with which to establish a
partnership, DC firms may be concerned with motivating LDC partners to perform over time.  In
other words, contracts specifying effort on the part of the LDC firms must be enforced.  As Egan
and Mody (1992, p. 326) put it, DC firms find it important that LDC partners “do what they say
they will do.”
2  Enforcement is particularly challenging in the setting of DC-LDC partnerships,
since international and LDC legal institutions are not as powerful or developed as those within
DCs.
An extension of our model allows us to address the roles of three common enforcement5
     
3Egan and Mody (1992) further point out the value of frequent contact and reliable
communication technologies.
     
4Dixit and Pindyck (1995, p. 111) provide a numerical example where a firm can invest in
R&D to reveal information rather than rely on the passage of time.
institutions:  direct enforcement (monitoring), self-enforcement, and community enforcement.  We
highlight the role of monitoring, which is especially important and visible in practice.  For
example, Rhee et al. (1984, p. 62) state of Korean exporters of manufactures that, “Because of
the activities of foreign buyers in supervising and checking export shipments, the exporting firms
had a strong motive to implement effective methods of quality control.”
3  We demonstrate
theoretically how the level of monitoring depends on the LDC firms’ prospects for establishing
relationships with new DC partners.  These prospects are influenced by matching friction, the
extent of community enforcement, and the degree of caution exercised by DC firms at the
beginning of relationships.  We emphasize the inverse relation between starting small and
monitoring.
Our model is related to two strands of the literature.  The main, decision-theoretic,
component of our analysis is most clearly related to the literature on irreversible investment under
uncertainty (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  Unlike this literature, our analysis embeds the
investing firm’s decision within a search problem, and information is revealed by “starting small”
rather than by the passage of time.
4  Closer in spirit to our model is Horstmann and Markusen
(1996), who analyze the choice by a multinational firm seeking to enter a new (foreign) market
between direct investment and contracting with a local sales agent. Information gained from the
agency contract is useful in the decision whether to pursue direct investment, hence the agency
contract is analogous to “starting small” (though unlike starting small in that it may be desirable to6
     
5Our model identifies starting small as a response to uncertainty.  The literature contains some
complementary work in which starting small arises due to asymmetric information.  For example,
Watson (1996) studies a model of partnerships in which agents are uncertain about each others’
incentives.  He shows that it is optimal to start small and gradually raise the stakes in such an
environment.  In the present context, possibilities for opportunistic behavior on the part of an
LDC partner are greatly reduced by the monitoring to which it is routinely subjected by the DC
firm.
extend it indefinitely).  Again, the firm’s decision is not embedded within a search problem in that
it cannot search over potential agents.  Within the search literature, the closest model appears to
be that of Jovanovic (1979) since he allows the searching worker to learn about the quality of his
match with a firm over time rather than having to decide immediately whether to match for life or
look for another firm.   Again information is revealed only by the passage of time, so a fortiori the
worker cannot vary the intensity of the “investment” in learning he is making (by staying with the
present firm) at any point in time.
5 
To allow our model to handle these complications we simplify greatly (relative to, say,
Dixit and Pyndyck 1994) the modeling of time (discrete rather than continuous) and of
uncertainty (the outcome of the large project is permitted to take only two values).  We feel that
little is lost thereby for our purposes because we do not want to develop decision-making
guidelines such as hurdle rates or optimal stopping rules.  
The second strand of the literature relevant for our theoretical exercise is that which
analyzes incentives for ongoing cooperation when severance leads to random rematching. 
Examples include Ramey and Watson's (1996) model of contracting and ownership, Datta (1996),
and Ghosh and Ray (1996).  Also worth noting is Watson's (1999a,b) analysis of starting small in
settings of incomplete information.  We discuss these and other papers below.
The next section of this paper presents the assumptions and notation of our model and24
     
21Kandori (1992) and Greif (1993), among others, have studied community enforcement.
this firm.  As a result, s decreases for LDC firms that have misbehaved.
21
In general, community sanctions are likely to be effective when DC firms communicate
regularly and share information about the performance of LDC firms.  Strong network ties, which
are often maintained in reality, can facilitate the required communication.  Intermediaries can also
play an important role in this regard.  Egan and Mody (1992, p. 330) verify the practice of
community enforcement and the existence of networks.  They write:
Although buyers typically do not tell other buyers of particular deals with
suppliers, they often will discuss the suppliers’ qualifications, demands, and
past performance.  Willingness to supply accurate supplier references is a
part of the mutual obligations within the industry network.
Our analysis in this section is intended to be quite simplistic, allowing us to generate
useful intuition on strategic issues without additional theoretical complexity.  As a result, we
have left out some features of relationships that are obviously important as well, and we have not
touched on several other theoretical issues.  For example, it would be instructive to perform a
fuller analysis of the matching process and to consider more sophisticated contracting.  In
addition, we have not modelled contract negotiation between the LDC and DC firms, nor
between the DC firms and their sentries.  For related work addressing matching and contract
negotiation, see Ramey and Watson (1996), de Marzo and Lockwood (1998), and den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (1999).
VI.   Implications and Suggestions for Further Research
In this paper we studied a characteristic way in which DC buying firms build partnerships25
     
22This is especially true when the aim of the partners is to generate exports to DC markets. 
Gereffi (1995) notes that LDC firms participate in exports of “branded” products to DCs in four
different ways:  export-processing (or in-bond) assembly, component-supply subcontracting,
original equipment manufacturing, and original brand-name manufacturing.  Only the last of these
does not necessarily involve participation by DC firms, and is the exception rather than the rule.
     
23Rhee, Ross-Larson, and Pursell (1984, Chapter 5) report abundant evidence for this based on
their survey of Korean exporters of manufactures.
with LDC suppliers.  We focused on the role that an unfamiliar environment plays in inducing the
DC firms to “start small” in their relationships with LDC partners, on the persistence of these
relationships in the face of opportunities for the DC firms to form new partnerships, and on the
method used to motivate the effort of LDC firms.  Better understanding of the decisions made by
DC firms regarding cooperation with LDC firms is important because, among other things, this
cooperation is a major source of technology transfer from DCs to LDCs.
22  Even when the DC
firm is a buyer but not an equity partner (is not involved in a joint venture with the LDC firm), as
is typically the case when the DC firm is a retailer rather than a manufacturer, significant
technology transfer takes place.
23  From the point of view of these DC firms, Pack and Page
(1994, pp. 220-221) note that
The motivation of the purchasers is to obtain still lower-cost, better quality
products from major suppliers whose products account for a significant
percentage of profits.  To achieve this they are willing to transmit tacit and
occasionally proprietary knowledge from their other OECD suppliers. 
Such transfers of knowledge are likely to characterize simpler production
sectors such as clothing and footwear or more generally those older
technologies that are not hedged by restrictions adopted to increase
appropriability, such as patents and trade secrets.
This source of technology transfer has grown in importance in the last two to three decades as the26
     
24The “developing country” share of imports of manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 68) to
“developed market economies” increased from 4.8 percent in 1970 to 14.5 percent in 1991
(UNCTAD 1994, Table 3.3B, p. 94, with definitions of country groups provided in Tables 1.1
and 1.2).
amount of manufacturing in LDCs for markets in DCs has increased dramatically.
24
Regarding technology transfer, ours is a strictly partial equilibrium model.  If the matching
process we describe does indeed entail considerable transfer of technological know-how from the
DC firms to their LDC partners, its aggregate effect on productivity and incomes in the host
country, and the feedback to search and investment decisions by the DC firms, are interesting
subjects for future research.30
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